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Did Aristotle have a concept of “intuition”? 
Some thoughts on translating nous
Han Baltussen
In this paper I propose to review existing translations of nous in Aristotle in order 
to show that translating it as “intuition” is problematic. A proposal to fi nd a new 
direction for interpreting the term is given, based on a richer understanding of the 
modern notion of intuition in cognitive psychology. I end with adding some pas-
sages to the usual set which deserve further investigation.
Introduction
In at least three accounts discussing knowledge Aristotle makes certain claims 
about how we acquire knowledge, and in one passage he talks about a form of 
comprehension which is described as “an unmediated grasp of important founda-
tional concepts” (e.g. APost. 99b20–211). Th is phrase, translating important Greek 
terms, already commits itself to a certain interpretation of key concepts, centered 
around nous. In this paper it is my modest aim to discuss an issue connected to 
translation and its impact on interpreting concepts. I will fi rst introduce the prob-
lem and its context before dealing with the choices underlying translation. As this 
is a preliminary exploration, the net result will be limited and mostly negative in 
that I reject the indiscriminate use of “intuition” for nous and only give a rough 
sketch of how this line of enquiry could be pursued.2
Th e usual way to unpack Aristotle’s statement quoted above is to focus on 
“unmediated”, and to say that what he means is grasping a state of aff airs or an 
object without (discursive) reasoning. Reasoning would here have to be deductive 
reasoning, so that “unmediated” can also be read as “without explicitly providing 
1 I have followed the normal convention of referring to passages in Aristotle, which is to refer to 
the page numbers, column letters and/or chapter sections of the standard edition of the works of 
Aristotle, edited by Bekker. These page numbers, column letters and chapter sections are repeated 
in all modern editions of Aristotle’s works.
2 I take my approach to be complementary to Lesher 1973, who (with some qualifi cations) also goes 
against describing nous as intuition (45, 64), attacking the problem from the Greek side and nar-
rowly focused on APost.
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a cause or a middle term”. Th e Aristotelian notion I am talking about is of course 
nous. Th e claims Aristotle makes about nous have evoked elaborate discussion, in 
particular over the question whether his account of knowledge is really empiri-
cist or whether at the end of his Posterior Analytics in his genetic account of 
the acquisition of knowledge (the famous chapter 2.19), he gives in to a form 
of rationalism (Kahn, 1981). But in this paper I shall not decide between the 
Aristotle, by Francesco Hayez, 1811.
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empiricist or rationalist camp. In most interpretations the notion of nous receives 
diff erent translations but many use the term “intuition” — a term which in almost 
all cases remains either undefi ned or under-defi ned. It is my claim that the trans-
lations cover up the more fundamental issue to what extent the modern concept 
of intuition (whatever that is) can be mapped onto Aristotle’s account of nous or 
intellect, and whether such categories as “empirical” and “rational” do justice to his 
view (cf. Kahn, 1981). 
I believe that the translation of nous as “intuition” covers up a misconstrual of 
this notion which requires clarifi cation. Moreover, since nous is said to play a role in 
the attainment of basic starting-points (APost. 2.1; Topics 1.14), one’s initial reaction 
is to resist giving such an important role to what many take to be a non-rational 
faculty. It also raises the further question, which I cannot answer here, of how it 
relates to the claim that dialectic reaches principles and why Aristotle would need 
both. So for now I intend to do two things: fi rst, to look for a clearer and, as I hope 
to show, a richer notion of intuition from a contemporary perspective; secondly, to 
place this against Aristotle’s implicit and explicit claims about nous. Th e main part 
of the paper constitutes an exploration of the notion “intuition” and is partly in the 
form of a critique of some existing interpretations. I stress that it represents a pre-
liminary exploration of a terminological issue which is fundamental to interpreting 
Aristotle’s core notion of “unmediated grasp”.
I. Empirical versus a priori?
Given that we do not have one systematic treatise setting out Aristotle’s “theory” 
of knowledge, the fi rst problem with his epistemology is that one needs to recon-
struct it from several passages in diff erent works. At least three accounts typical 
of his perspectival approach are usually included: there is his account in the On 
the soul, dealing with perception and mental processes, another in the Ethics on 
mental states preceding proper actions, and yet another one in Posterior Analytics 
on a formalised system of demonstration based on unmediated, true premises. 
Here it is not obvious how to reconcile the foundationalist claims in his dialectical 
methodology with the so-called scientifi c claims about knowledge. Barnes (1969) 
countered the Baconian picture that the Posterior Analytics would be a systema-
tised methodology for scientifi c investigation, while suggesting that it was rather a 
metho dology for teaching and imparting knowledge. Yet more recently Burnyeat 
(1981) qualifi ed this by pointing out that this would be a poor form of pedagogy, 
while he suggests persuasively to view demonstration as a way of imparting under-
standing by leading the advanced student on the basis of her implicit knowledge to 
full and understanding by demonstrative method.
Limitations of space do not allow to bring out the investigative role dialectic 
(defi ned in a specifi c way) can play according to Aristotle and how it is useful in 
the search for “fi rst principles” as a kind of meta-theory, so a summary account 
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will have to suffi  ce here. Aristotle argues (rightly) that a specifi c science cannot 
determine its own principles within the framework of its own fi eld (Top. 101b; 
Rhet. 1352b). Th us dialectic can be construed as a valuable part of scientifi c metho-
dology, arguing from foundations to the foundations, whereas Posterior Analytics 
represents the deductive route arguing from foundations (cf. Evans, 1977).
Let us now consider some of the implicit claims about nous which can be found 
in the following translations: “intellectual intuition” (Ross), “mental intuition” 
(Alan), “intellect” (Grote), “intuitive reason” (Lee, Ross). Th ese translations seem to 
make nous a quasi-mystical element in the account of how we acquire knowledge. 
It is important to see that this is not a mere verbal point. Th e specifi cation of adjec-
tives in e.g. Ross’ and Alan’s version (“intellectual” and “mental”) sound an apolo-
getic note and apparently are meant to qualify the concept in such a way that we 
may forgive them for using the word “intuition” at all. Whatever the word means, 
they seem to tell us, we should be picking out the intellectual aspect of it, while 
implying that there is some other side to intuition, the kind we don’t want here. 
While we all use the word “intuition”, and think we more or less know what it 
means, this seems to involve some kind of self-referential justifi cation in that we 
very oft en don’t make explicit what it means. To put it another way, we seem to 
know intuitively what the word “intuition” means. Th is is highly uninformative 
and smacks of circularity. But in approaching an ancient thinker with similar and 
systematic concerns about knowledge it is unwise not to be explicit about such 
complex terms. One simply does not want to import unwarranted meanings or 
notions. Th e least one can say, and usually does say, is that intuition involves 
immediacy in grasping objects or states of aff airs. But that seems hardly suffi  cient. 
So should we say intuition is a composite of intellectual and non-intellectual ele-
ments, or can it only be one of these? Or is there yet another way of interpreting 
it? Whichever way we do interpret it, it seems clear that our own (modern) idea 
of intuition is likely to be of importance in trying to defi ne Aristotle’s nous. We 
should however beware that we do not import or impose our notions onto his, 
which as we just saw leads to an awkwardly apologetic or distorted rendering of 
terms.
Th ere is currently considerable debate and progress on our understanding 
of intuitive knowledge and its role in discovery and creative thinking. I want to 
explore how contemporary views on workings of the mind might help understand 
this idea of immediacy and insight in Aristotle. I here make selective use of some 
current ideas on intuition in cognitive sciences, most of which make no reference 
to Aristotle. 
A recent account of intuition in the area of psychology will help us establish 
some fi rmer ground for defi ning intuition on the basis of evidence acquired in 
experiments. G. Claxton has written a broad study on the role of intuition collect-
ing up the results of empirical investigations spanning several decades. His aim 
is encapsulated in a remark about the still current position towards the notion of 
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intuition: “Th ose who disparage intuition are reacting, oft en unwittingly, against 
the presumption that intuition constitutes a form of knowledge that is ‘higher’ than 
mere reason, or even infallible” (Claxton, 1998:50). A two-step analysis will show 
how we can make sense of this statement, and it will also allow us to argue about 
the relation between the rational and non-rational in a meaningful way. I should 
stress that Claxton is not trying to clarify intuition per se or — to mention another 
common example in this context — to explain such things as the female intuition 
of mothers who just “know” what their babies want (without wanting to disparage 
this). Claxton rather focuses on creative thought, in particular when we are forced 
to deal with new and complex situations which require creative decisions. Th e evi-
dence shows that decisions made aft er study and refl ection of complex data usually 
arise without full awareness of their origin. His emphasis is also more on the proc-
ess of intuition as non-linguistic thought rather than on its results and the question 
to what extent they are a reliable basis for belief or decisions.
I shall start by provisionally adopting Claxton’s new defi nition for intuition: 
“a mental process which is non-conscious, but nevertheless rational”. Th is work-
ing defi nition will allow us to disentangle the rational from the irrational within 
the concept of intuition, which Claxton sees as a kind of borderline phenomenon 
between conscious and non-conscious thought. Claxton’s analysis is based on a 
very interesting synthesis of a range of recent experiments into creative non-con-
scious mental processes which exhibit patterns indicating a degree of rule-follow-
ing and consistency (i.e. they can be termed rational). Experts have agreed for some 
time that the Freudian notion is untenable, that is, we should not divide the mind 
up into conscious and subconscious, in which the second is that infamous quag-
mire of problems from one’s personal past. It remains to be seen, however, to what 
extent the negative aspect of the Freudian dichotomy still infl uences the way in 
which we speak about intuition and a concept such as Aristotle’s nous. Th e sense of 
embarrassment noticeable in the authors of the early twentieth century, indicates 
that they were not yet free from this implicit set of values regarding the oppositions 
rational/conscious and non-rational/unconscious.
As an alternative to the Freudian picture of intuitive thought Claxton argues 
persuasively for a double threshold in our mental make-up, one between the con-
scious and non-conscious, while further subdividing the non-conscious into two 
sections, one of which is located “below” the conscious and above the subconscious. 
Th e criterion here is accessibility, that is, the extent to which we are consciously 
aware of our mental operations. On the basis of indirect evidence, certain non-
conscious processes can be shown to be rational, in the sense that they obey 
certain implicit rules (for example, we normally anticipate the shape and size of 
a room upon entering, assuming it will not have a fl oor slanting at a very sharp 
angle; experiments using optical illusions show that the suggestion of a sharp slant 
upon entering a room will take us by surprise and infl uence our body movements 
accordingly without conscious decisions). One major outcome of the experiments 
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is that there is a very active (though slow) mode of thinking, which, while non-con-
scious, has a major role in creative thought. Such evidence is mostly indirect, but 
the sample is considerable and accumulative. Th e basic mechanisms of this “under-
mind” (Claxton, 1997:52) are analogy and imagery, and it is non-linguistic thought 
which operates according to certain rules. Th at is the reason why I think this can be 
helpful in looking at Aristotle’s notion of “unmediated insight” or “comprehension” 
(Barnes): just because we don’t know where an idea is coming from does not mean 
it cannot be valuable.
Th e implications of this division of the mind are considerable. First, it helps 
to demystify those activities of the mind which are involved in creative thinking, 
famously reported by scientists as thinking in images when reaching important 
insights or making breakthrough discoveries (Kekule, Einstein). Second, it allows 
for a form of rational thought at a non-conscious level which can be used as an 
explanatory factor in making thinking responsible for the premature articulation of 
ideas. Th e transition from this implicit knowledge to a more explicit form might be 
exemplifi ed, for example, by the so-called “tip-of-the-tong phenomenon”, where cer-
tain ideas only “break” through the (upper) threshold into our consciousness when 
one is relaxed and uninhibited by rational control. Claxton’s aim is to make us trust 
our intuitions more, ours is to reach a more detailed understanding of intuition.
II. Aristotle and premature articulation
If we now go back to Aristotle, this picture can be usefully tested. Th ere are obvious 
similarities with this notion of “intuitive” thought as the premature articulation of 
ideas and intuition.3 It would of course be rash to think there can be a full overlap 
in the features that are emerging from modern cognitive views and the functions 
ascribed to nous, as there are also some clear diff erences. For instance, the contem-
porary view is not that intuition is infallible (see Claxton quote p. 4; cf. Kal, 1988:47 
ff .) whereas for Aristotle nous itself cannot err (APost. 2.19, 100b7–8). But what this 
more explicit and richer notion of intuition does do is avoid the embarrassment 
of the irrational so oft en implied in the corrective defi nitions and translations dis-
cussed earlier: by allowing for a non-conscious, or pre-conscious, stage of thinking 
which exhibits regularity (“rules”), we can be justifi ed in thinking that non-con-
scious thought is not fully irrational.
What kind of work did Aristotle expect the nous to do? We can glean certain 
things from the way in which he positions it at the centre of the theoretical and 
practical, featuring in both intellectually high-order insight and as immediate grasp 
as a basis for know-how (practical nous in the ethics and craft s, EN 6). Aristotle 
makes at least the following claims (based on Lesher and Barnes):
3 Cf. Kahn, 1982, 396: “the preliminary or pre-scientific recognition of a phenomenon”.
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(1) it is “more accurate” (akribesteron) than any other kind of knowledge 
(100b8–9) and “more true” than episteme (not be taken as infallibility, as Lesher 
points out [63], since both episteme and nous are always true. Akribeia here 
seems to mean “most in possession of its fi rst principles”)
(2) it is also called both gnôsis (“knowledge by acquaintance”) and epistêmê 
(“scientifi c knowledge”), 99b24, cf. 71b16, 72b18–21, 76a 16–22 (Burnyeat 1981: 
131)
(3) it is a way of grasping things which are most knowable and familiar in them-
selves (100b9–10; cf. 72 b24–5), a disposition (hexis gnôrizousa) which implies 
full conviction and understanding (presumably “full” as opposed to “implicit” 
or “partial”)
(4) nous represents a more abstract level of understanding, in the sense that it 
is said to be “further from perception” (inferred from 86a29, cf. Barnes, 1993: 
187).
Th ese features suggest a path to understanding which allows empirical input 
(Lesher, 1973:62): obviously much more is involved, but it is clear that Aristotle 
allows it to be reached by induction. So if we adhere to the sense of “intuition” 
defi ned as a grasp of things in an unmediated way, we can, I think, still use the 
term for nous. Th ink of a person concerned with making moral decisions and how 
to explain her reasoning in such a way that she would not have to go through a 
syllogism fi rst before implementing action, yet somehow she knows the reason for 
doing it (a worry about Aristotle’s picture). Th is form of intuitive grasping might 
account for that, since the suppressed premise is grasped (as in the enthymeme). 
One consequence of this position seems to be that we have to reject Lesher’s 
rejection of “intuition”. He tentatively presents two defi nitions, one (which he 
accepts) is rather bland and uninformative: “simply to have an insight or realize a 
truth” (1973:64). Th e other is “a faculty which acquires knowledge about the world 
in an a priori or non-empirical manner” (ibid.). I think the underlying distinction 
between intuition and empirical is a telling one. It limits intuition to the part of 
mental activity which is not relying on empirical evidence.
His conclusion that nous is “the grasp of the universal principle, acquired by 
induction from particular cases and constituting the source of scientifi c knowl-
edge” seems plausible. Th is interpretation allows us to determine to what degree the 
grasp of principles involves reasoning of some or any kind. I would also hold that 
it saves us from the suppressed embarrassment of requiring a term which needs 
“upgrading” to become philosophically acceptable. Barnes’ term “comprehension” 
avoids that aspect by suffi  ciently indicating intellectual activity, but it seems an 
impoverishment in relation to the perceptual basis of intuitive thought. 
I admit that this thumbnail account is only a fi rst exploration and leaves much 
undiscussed, such as the role of phantasia which is an important factor in memory, 
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dreaming and as intermediary between perception and thought. Another impor-
tant question is whether we can attribute to Aristotle a notion of unconscious proc-
esses at all. It is this particular question which I want to look at briefl y as a way of 
indicating the next possible step in the analysis of nous.
III. Unexplored territory: pre-conscious 
 processes in Aristotle? 
If I am right to take this revised version of nous as sometimes representing sud-
den unmediated grasp, this could lead to an interesting follow-up. It allows for 
certain aspects of Aristotle’s remarks to be taken as an indication of an awareness 
of unconscious processes. Granted, it is of course one thing to use contemporary 
concerns and research into intuition as a way of clarifying Aristotle’s — in itself a 
justifi able method in history of philosophy —, it is quite another to claim that he 
came close to a notion of intuition like ours. I shall therefore present a few exam-
ples to see whether there is room for further narrowing the gap between his notion 
and ours. Th is means I will tentatively explore some passages rather than present a 
fully argued case. 
Four passages come to mind which exhibit features hinting at creative thought:
(i) analogical thought is mentioned in Topics 1.15–18, where he discusses the 
instruments for coming up with arguments and propositions, and recommends 
trying to think “laterally”, across generic borders of certain areas and disciplines;
(ii) pictorial thought processes are mentioned in On Memory which somehow 
gives place to the non-linguistic (perhaps to be compared to some aspect of 
phantasia).
In addition, there are those thought processes we are not always aware of while 
they occur:
(iii) In On Dreams he speaks of “unnoticed” stimuli which do occur and return 
in dreams. What could these be, and what does he mean by “unnoticed” (aft er 
all he is able to talk about them)?
(iv) Finally, he mentions a mental activity called ankhinoia: “a talent for ‘quick 
thinking’”, which in the context of syllogistic reasoning means “‘spotting’ the 
middle term (cause) in an imperceptible time” (APost. 1.34, 89b10–11; Barnes 
translates “acumen”). Here the language resorts to visual metaphors, as if it were 
only a matter of “seeing” the solution: what Aristotle may be trying to convey 
here is the immediate and non-linguistic aspect of thought. It is “immediate” 
both in time and in appearance, because it takes no time at all, and lacks “media-
tion” by way of intermediate premises or steps.
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Th ese examples may exhibit rather superfi cial similarities with what we now think 
of as intuitive thought. Yet the views expressed exhibit, if not explicitly then per-
haps intuitively, a grasp of certain aspects of non-conscious processes in our men-
tal make-up. Th is deserves a closer look, not only to arrive at better documented 
picture of his account of mental states, but also to explore further whether his 
view on an understanding of, and thinking about, the world was setting out on a 
new path by including less obvious features of our mental capacities into a wider 
epistemological framework.
To conclude, I hope to have shown that a way of approaching the issue of 
“unmediated grasp of basic concepts” from a new angle can be fruitful. Th e con-
ceptual analysis will need to progress by reformulating the problem as to how we 
can think about nous and its contemporary counterparts. Post-Freudian analysis 
requires awareness of the cultural baggage involved in common parlance about the 
mind’s characteristics and activities. Th e lack of a full overlap between Aristotelian 
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